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Imwinkelried: Preliminary Thoughts on an Attorney-Client Privilege for Law Firm

PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON AN
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR LAW
FIRMS: WHEN A CURRENT CLIENT
THREATENS TO SUE THE FIRM FOR
MALPRACTICE, DOES THE PRIVILEGE APPLY
TO THE FIRM’S CONSULTATION WITH INHOUSE COUNSEL ABOUT THE POTENTIAL
CLAIM?
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ideally, the attorney-client relationship is supposed to be cooperative
and trusting. On one side, the client approaches the attorney, describes
his or her legal problem, and discloses their hoped-for outcome in the
transaction or litigation. In addition, the client reveals to the attorney all
the facts relevant to the transaction or litigation. For his or her part, after
carefully evaluating the facts and researching the pertinent law, the
attorney gives the client legal advice about the problem. Trusting the
attorney, the client accepts the attorney’s advice. The client and attorney
then work together to achieve the client’s desired outcome.
Although the preceding paragraph describes the ideal, in many cases
the ideal does not match the reality. In numerous cases, to a degree, the
relationship becomes adversary.1 The client either sues the attorney for
malpractice or threatens to do so.2 For decades, the American Bar
Association (“A.B.A.”) has closely monitored the number of malpractice
claims filed against practitioners. Its Standing Committee on Lawyers’
Professional Responsibility has collected data from attorneys’ liability
insurers for 1985, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, and, most recently, 2011.3 The
Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; former chair,
Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools; author, THE NEW WIGMORE: A
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2d ed. 2010).
The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Richard Underwood of the
University of Kentucky School of Law and Mr. Charles Mokriski of the Proskauer firm who
kindly assisted the author in the preparation of this Article.
1
See, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746
S.E.2d 98, 109 (Ga. 2013) (recognizing that “once the relationship between the attorney and
client develops into an adversarial one” certain privileges attach).
2
Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1721
(2005) (recognizing “the growing incidence of claims against lawyers”).
3
JASON T. VAIL & KATHLEEN MARIE EWINS, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON
LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2008–2011, at 1 (2012).
*
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most recent 2011 study covered 2008 through 2011, years affected by the
“turbulent . . . adverse economic climate” in the United States.4 That
study found that the total number of malpractice claims reported
jumped by over 30% between 2007 and 2011.5 Many of the leading
liability insurers have become so concerned that they strongly
recommend to their insured law firms that the firm appoint an
experienced in-house counsel to advise firm members on issues such as
malpractice and compliance with ethical standards.6
Suppose that during the representation of an outside client plaintiff,
the trial judge dismisses one count in the complaint on the ground that
the firm did not file the count stating that cause of action within the
period of limitations.7 While the firm is seeking to persuade the judge to
reconsider the ruling, the client expresses its displeasure with the ruling.
The client does not immediately terminate the firm. Yet, the client
grumbles, suggesting that it is considering suing the firm for
professional negligence. At the suggestion of its liability insurer, the
firm in question has designated one of its partners as in-house counsel.
At this point the firm members representing the plaintiff consult with
their in-house counsel about the potential malpractice claim. The firm
maintains internal records documenting the consultations.
Several things are clear. To begin, if a non-client subsequently
sought discovery of the records, the case law would generally allow the
client and the law firm to assert the privilege against the non-client.8 By
way of example, assume that the defendant in the original lawsuit
demanded that the firm produce the written communications between
the firm members and the in-house counsel. Both the firm and its
outside client could object to production on the ground that the writings
are privileged.9

Id.
See id. at 5 (stating that the participating insurers reported 40,486 claims in 2007 and
52,982 claims in 2011).
6
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1722, 1758–59.
7
See Samson Habte, Law Firms Hopeful About Pending Rulings in Closely Watched
‘Intrafirm Privilege’ Cases, 81 U.S. L. Wk. (BNA No. 47) 1760, 1761 (June 11, 2013), available at
http://news.bna.com/lwln/LWLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=32048699&vname=lw1n
otallissues&jd=a0d9f2m7b4&split=0 (describing a similar hypothetical scenario discussed
by a panel at the 39th American Bar Association (“A.B.A.”) National Conference of
Professional Responsibility).
8
See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1730–33 (providing a series of case illustrations on this
issue).
“Taken together, the nonclient cases offer broad protection for in-firm
communication under the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 1732.
9
As holder, the client may assert the privilege in its own right; and the lawyer has
implied authority to assert the privilege on the client’s behalf. See 1 EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
4
5
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Suppose alternatively that the plaintiff client discharged the firm and
either sued the firm for malpractice or threatened to do so. In these
circumstances, if the firm later consulted either its in-house counsel or
another firm about the potential malpractice claim, the privilege would
attach to the consultations. The firm and its former client now stand in a
normal adversarial relationship; and, after its termination by the outside
client, the firm has a perfect right to seek counsel to prepare a defense
against the former client’s malpractice claim. However, one key issue is
unsettled. Suppose that while the firm continues to represent the outside
client, the firm members representing the outside client consult the inhouse counsel about the potential malpractice suit and, after the
termination of the relationship, the former client sues and seeks
production of the writings reflecting the consultation. In this variation of
the fact situation, may the firm assert the attorney-client privilege against
its former client?
That issue has produced a sharp split of authority. There are
relatively few published decisions on point to provide a firm with
guidance.10 Worse still, the authorities are badly divided.11 “For over
two decades, courts routinely rejected law firms’ efforts to shield internal
communications about potential malpractice liability from their
clients.”12 However, beginning in the mid-1990s, a counter-trend
developed.13 In 2013, two state courts, the Georgia Supreme Court and

§ 6.5.3, at 664–65 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2d ed. 2010) (discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Swidler & Berlin v. United States to illustrate this point).
10
See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1723 (“There are, so far, three cases on the
subject . . . .”); Cathryn M. Sadler, Note, The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications Between Lawyers Within the Same Firm: Evaluating United States v. Rowe, 30
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 859, 860, 872–73 (1998) (denoting “a lack of authority” on this issue and
providing some limited case illustrations); Gail Diane Cox, Court Expands Client Privilege:
Associates Are Deemed Counsel for Their Own Firms, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at A6 (denoting
a ‘“dearth of authority’” on the issue based on commentary rather than precedent). In RFF
Family Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, the court remarked that it found itself in
relatively “‘uncharted jurisprudential waters.’” 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Mass. 2013)
(quoting Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 730 S.E.2d
608 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)).
11
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98,
104 (Ga. 2013) (discussing the divide in case law over a law firm’s ability to claim attorneyclient privilege for communications with its in-house counsel).
12
Habte, supra note 7, at 1761.
13
See Sadler, supra note 10, at 860 (“United States v. Rowe, was one of the first cases to
tackle the issue of intra-firm privilege . . . finding that communications between lawyers
within a firm could be protected by the [attorney-client] privilege.” (footnote omitted)).
The Ninth Circuit handed down the decision in Rowe in 1996. United States v. Rowe, 96
F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996).
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the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,14 joined the ranks of the
minority of jurisdictions permitting the firm to assert the privilege
against its former client.15
At first blush, a non-lawyer might be outraged at the notion of
allowing a law firm to shield documents generated during its
representation of an outside client from that client. It may appear that
the firm’s ethical duty of loyalty to a current client should trump the
firm’s evidentiary privilege. However, the thesis of this Article is that
the Georgia and Massachusetts courts came to the right result.
Part II of this Article is descriptive, surveying the current split of
authority.16 In contrast, Part III and Part IV of the Article are
evaluative.17 Part III addresses the merits of the threshold policy
question of whether a law firm should ever be permitted to invoke the
attorney-client privilege to shield in-house consultations about a client’s
potential malpractice claim from the outside client.18 Part III argues that
the courts subscribing to the majority view have misconstrued the case
law on the so-called fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.19
Part III concludes that at least in some circumstances, a firm has the right
to invoke the privilege against its former client.20
Next, Part IV attempts to define the circumstances in which courts
should uphold an intra-firm privilege against a former client.21 In
particular, Part IV analyzes the thorny question of whether the privilege
attaches to the firm’s in-house consultations even when the firm engages
in such consultations without the outside client’s consent.22 Part IV
contends that the courts requiring the outside client’s consent have
misconceived an evidence issue as an ethics question.23
This Article does not purport to offer a definitive resolution of these
issues. Given the paucity of authority on point and the most recent
decisions from Georgia and Massachusetts, it would be presumptuous to
14

St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 746 S.E.2d at 102; RFF Family P’ship, LP, 991 N.E.2d at 1067–

68.
15
See RFF Family P’ship, LP, 991 N.E.2d at 1078–79 (citing other jurisdictions’ decisions
on the issue and explaining its opposing conclusion); Robert L. Byman, So, You’ve Screwed
Up. Now What? NAT’L L.J., (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=12
02637723731/So-Youve-Screwed-Up-Now-What%3Fmcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL
(discussing the Georgia and Massachusetts decisions).
16
See infra Part II.
17
See infra Parts III–IV.
18
See infra Part III.
19
See infra Part III.A.
20
See infra Part III.B.
21
See infra Part IV.
22
See infra Part IV.B.
23
See infra Part IV.B.2.
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claim to be able to do so. However, the prevalence of legal malpractice
claims makes these issues critical to both the bar and its clientele. The
intent of this Article is to promote a deeper, more robust debate between
the proponents of the traditional majority and emerging minority views.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE
QUESTION OF THE FIRM’S RIGHT TO ASSERT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE FOR ITS IN-HOUSE CONSULTATIONS ABOUT A POTENTIAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIM BY A THEN CURRENT CLIENT
As Part I noted, there is presently a split of authority over the issue
of a firm’s ability to invoke the attorney-client privilege to shield inhouse consultations about a possible malpractice action by a then current
client. First, Part II.A discusses the traditional view denying the firm the
right to assert the privilege.24 Second, Part II.B explains the minority
view giving the firm the right to assert the privilege.25
A. The Traditional, Majority View Denying the Firm the Right to Assert the
Privilege Against Its Former Outside Client
The majority view is that the firm cannot assert the attorney-client
privilege against its former client.26 For decades, “[a] nearly unbroken
line of cases” adopted this view.27 Some of these cases went to the length
of announcing that the firm could not invoke the privilege against the
former client “under any circumstances.”28 First, this section discusses
state authority in this regard.29 It then goes on to explain the federal
authority supporting this view.30
1.

State Authority

There is both state and federal support for the majority view. A
depublished California decision, McCormick v. Superior Court,31 illustrates
many courts’ reluctance to allow a privilege to attach to a firm’s in-house

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
26
RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1076–77 (Mass
2013).
27
Habte, supra note 7, at 1761.
28
E.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d
98, 104 (Ga. 2013).
29
See infra Part II.A.1.
30
See infra Part II.A.2.
31
McCormick v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (depublished).
24
25
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consultations against a then current client.32 In McCormick, the client,
Nelson, made noises suggesting that he might sue the firm.33 At that
juncture, the firm hired and consulted with outside counsel about the
potential claim.34 In addition, the firm members working on Nelson’s
case consulted with Whitney, a member of the firm’s own management
committee.35 Nelson subsequently sued the firm.36 During pretrial
discovery, Nelson demanded production of a number of the firm’s
documents.37 The requested documents included writings reflecting
consultations between the firm members representing Nelson and
Whitney.38 The firm cited the attorney-client privilege as the basis for its
refusal to produce.39 To support its objection, the firm submitted
Whitney’s declaration to the effect that Whitney and the consulting firm
members created the documents “for the ultimate use of [the firm] in
representing its own interests and other counsel ultimately retained by
[the firm] in the event that [the client] did file a lawsuit.”40
The intermediate appellate court in California rejected the firm’s
argument.41 The court professed that it could not understand how the
firm could simultaneously be both the attorney for Nelson and a client
with a privilege against Nelson: “If the McCormick firm was the client,
who was its lawyer? And who was the client communicating with?”42
The court characterized the firm’s position as a contention that “its
internally generated documents [were] . . . privileged ‘communications’
with its lawyer, i.e., with itself.”43 Instead, the court concluded that the
communications between Whitney and the firm members working on
Nelson’s case did not qualify as “confidential communications between a
client and a client’s lawyer.”44
It is true that in some passages, the court seemed to stop short of
adopting a sweeping holding that a firm could never invoke a privilege
against a litigant who was a firm client at the time of the
32
See Barbara S. Gillers, Preserving the Attorney Client Privilege for Advice of a Law Firm’s
In-House Counsel, 2000 PROF. LAW.: SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 107, 110–11 (2000) (discussing the
court’s holding in McCormick).
33
Id. at 110.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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communications.45 However, in other passages the court employed
broad language implying that the court would never entertain an
attorney-client privilege claim for intra-firm communications about a
potential malpractice claim by a then current client.46
2.

Federal Authority

There are also several federal opinions lending support to the
majority view.47 One of the most cited federal opinions is the 1989
decision by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re Sunrise Security
Litigation.48 Sunrise was the seminal decision applying the so-called
“fiduciary duty exception” to the privilege in this context.49 In Sunrise, a
law firm had represented a failed savings and loan association
(Sunrise).50 The firm was joined as a defendant with the association in an
action by both the association’s former shareholders and the
government.51 When the plaintiffs sought production of some of the
firm’s internal work documents concerning the firm’s representation of
the association, the firm objected on privilege grounds.52
Unlike the McCormick court, the court was willing to accept the
generalization that “‘a law firm may consult its own attorneys as house
counsel to secure legal advice in connection with or related to the firm’s
representation of a client, and as a result obtain the protection of the
attorney client privilege on the basis that it is its own client.’”53 The
court stated that it was “not willing to hold that a law firm may never
make privileged communications with [its own] in house counsel.”54
However, the court then carved out an important exception to the
generalization—citing the state rule modeled after A.B.A. Model Rule of
Professional Responsibility 1.7 on a lawyer’s duty of loyalty, the court
asserted that applying the privilege to the firm’s in-house consultations

45
See id. at 111 (noting the court’s remark that the firm had not taken any clear,
definitive steps to sufficiently differentiate normal intra-firm communications from the
communications between Whitney and the firm members representing Nelson).
46
See id. at 110 (“If the McCormick firm was the client, who was its lawyer? And who
was the client communicating with?”).
47
See, e.g., Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL 578989,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (refusing to follow a strict rule “requiring disclosure of all
communications relating to a client”).
48
130 F.R.D. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
49
Habte, supra note 7, at 1761.
50
Sadler, supra note 10, at 871.
51
Id.; In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 562.
52
In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 562–63.
53
Id. at 594–95.
54
Id. at 595.
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could conflict with the firm’s fiduciary duty to the then current client.55
The court stated that given the firm’s ethical duties, the privilege would
not attach to “communications or legal advice in which [the firm’s]
representation of itself violated Rule 1.7.”56 In the court’s mind, if the
firm’s in-house consultation created a conflict of interest between the
firm’s interests and those of the outside client, the privilege must yield.
As in the case of the McCormick decision, the Sunrise opinion mentioned
facts suggesting a more limited holding.57 However, the Sunrise court’s
assertion of the fiduciary exception was so forceful that the exception
seemed expansive enough to virtually swallow up the generalization.
After Sunrise, “the current-client issue lay dormant until two cases
decided in 2002.”58 One decision was Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit
Lyonnaise (Suisse), S.A.59 The firm, Rogers & Wells, represented Credit
Lyonnaise (CL) in certain oil transactions and related litigation. 60 During
the representation, CL told Rogers & Wells that if CL were found liable
in the litigation, in turn CL would attempt to hold Rogers & Wells
liable.61 After CL’s statement, the firm member heading Roger & Wells’
Clients and Ethics Committee conducted an interval review of the firm’s
representation of CL.62 Later CL fired Rogers & Wells and sued the firm
for malpractice.63 In the suit, CL sought production of the documents
reflecting the firm’s internal review.64 As in McCormick and Sunrise, the
firm cited the attorney-client privilege as a ground for objecting to the
production request.65
The court overruled the objection.66 The court relied on Sunrise as
precedent.67 The court reasoned that since CL “was still its client” at the
time of the internal review, the firm was “in no position to claim a
privilege against their client. While the privilege will be applicable
against all the world, it cannot be maintained against” CL.68 The court
Id. at 595 & n.8.
Id. at 597; see Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1735–36 (quoting the court and providing a
summary of the court’s reasoning).
57
See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1750 (“In In re Sunrise . . . firm in-house counsel had an
obvious conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 because the lawyers who acted as so-called firm
counsel were mostly the same lawyers who represented the outside client.”).
58
Id. at 1736.
59
220 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
60
Id. at 284.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 285.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 286.
66
Id. at 288.
67
Id. at 287.
68
Id.
55
56
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underscored the firm’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to its outside client at
the time of the in-house consultation.69 The court asserted flatly that “a
law firm cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege against a current
client when performing a conflict check in furtherance of representing
that client.”70 Once again, some commentators have argued that the Bank
Brussels ruling could be limited to the peculiar facts of the case.71
However, on its face the opinion reads as a ringing endorsement of the
fiduciary duty exception announced in Sunrise.72
The second noteworthy 2002 decision was Koen Book Distributors v.
Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C.73 The plaintiff
book company had hired the defendant firm for advice pertaining to a
security interest from one of the company’s customers, Crown Books
Corporation.74 When Crown Books filed for bankruptcy, the firm
represented Koen in the bankruptcy proceedings.75 However, Koen
became dissatisfied with the quality of the firm’s services and informed
the firm that it was considering filing a malpractice action.76 Ultimately,
Koen terminated the firm’s services in mid-August 2001.77 However, in
the interim the firm’s lawyers representing Koen consulted another firm
member about the “ethical and legal issues that had arisen out of the

Id.
Id. at 288.
71
E.g., Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1750–51. Professor Chambliss has proposed two
different bases for a narrow reading of the holding. One is that the firm member who
headed the Clients and Ethics Committee “was not formally designated or compensated as
in-house counsel.” Id. at 1750. The second is that the facts suggest that one of the purposes
of the consultation was the unethical objective of concealing the conflict from the client. Id.
at 1751. If that had been the firm’s objective, the crime/fraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege might come into play. Id. See generally 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE
NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.13.2.d, at 1166–99
(2d ed. 2010) (providing an in-depth overview of the crime-fraud exception).
72
Given the nature of the fact situation, the reader might wonder why the court did not
uphold the privilege on the ground that the party seeking discovery was a non-party. As
Part I pointed out, as a general proposition even the courts rejecting the assertion of the
privilege against the client at the time of the communication ordinarily sustain privilege
claims against third parties. See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1732–33 (explaining the scope
of the privilege regarding non-clients). However, as previously stated, one of the plaintiffs
in the instant case was a group of shareholders. The courts sometimes treat shareholders as
representatives of the corporate entity. Id. at 1733–34 (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d
1093 (5th Cir. 1970)). Thus, since the defendant had represented the corporate entity, the
court might have conceived the case as a dispute between representatives of the client (the
shareholders) and the client’s attorney (the law firm).
73
212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
74
Id. at 284.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
69
70
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portent of a malpractice action.”78 Those consultations generated a
number of internal firm documents.79 Koen later sued the firm for
malpractice.80 During discovery, Koen demanded that the firm produce
those documents.81 The firm resisted, citing the attorney-client privilege
as the justification for its refusal.82
Like the other 2002 decision, Bank Brussels, the Koen court turned to
Sunrise as authority.83 The court declared:
[A] law firm owes a fiduciary duty to a client and may
not engage in conflicting representations absent the
exceptions set forth in Rule 1.7 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Professional Conduct. Otherwise, to the extent
that the seeking or obtaining of legal advice by one
lawyer from another lawyer inside the firm “implicates
or creates a conflict of interest,” the attorney-client
privilege between the lawyers is vitiated.84
According to the court, the conflict negates the privilege.85 The court
found that the firm was “engaged in a conflict of interest . . . when it was
receiving information from and/or providing legal advice to several of
its lawyers while at the same time continuing to represent” Koen.86
Weighing the competing interests of the client and firm, the court
decided that the firm’s fiduciary duty to its client was “paramount.”87
The court acknowledged that its ruling placed the firm “in an unenviable
situation.”88 However, the court reasoned that if the firm neither
withdrew from representing the outside client nor obtained the client’s
consent to the in-house consultations about the client’s potential claim,
the firm had to “forego the benefit of the attorney-client
privilege . . . during this period.”89
Id.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 284–85.
84
Id. at 285 (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re Sunrise Sec. Litigation, 130 F.R.D. 560, 597
(E.D. Pa. 1989)).
85
E.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d
98, 103 (Ga. 2013).
86
Koen, 212 F.R.D. at 285–86.
87
Id. at 286.
88
Id.
89
Id.; see Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1739 (“The court noted that, once the client
threatened to sue, the firm could have tried to withdraw or sought the client’s consent for
its in-firm consultation, but the firm did neither. Thus, as long as the firm continued to
78
79
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A more recent federal decision in this line of authority is the 2008
bankruptcy court decision in In re Sonic Blue Inc.90 There the court
affirmed the majority Sunrise view with a rhetorical flourish:
[W]hen a law firm chooses to represent itself, it runs the
risk that the representation may create an impermissible
conflict of interest with one of more of its current clients.
In light of these ethical concerns, the courts that have
considered the issue have resoundingly found that,
where conflicting duties exist, the law firm’s right to
claim privilege must give way to the interest in
protecting current clients who may be harmed by the
conflict . . . . As a result, a law firm cannot assert the
attorney-client privilege against a current outside client
when the communications that it seeks to protect arise
out of self-representation that creates an impermissible
conflicting relationship with that outside client.91
B. The Growing Minority View
Although the Sonic Blue court declared in 2008 that “the courts that
have considered the issue have resoundingly” affirmed the majority
view,92 even at that time the assertion was an overstatement. There was
contrary federal authority then,93 and in 2013 two state supreme courts
opted to embrace the minority view.94
1.

Federal Authority

The leading federal authority is the 1996 decision by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Rowe.95 Rowe, a named
senior partner at a San Diego law firm, began to suspect that one of its
attorneys had mishandled client funds.96 He then tasked two young
associates to investigate the suspected misconduct.97 Rowe exchanged
represent the client, the court held that the firm could not maintain any privilege against
the client.” (footnote omitted)).
90
No. 03-51775, 2008 WL 170562 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008); see also RFF Family P’ship, LP
v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1076–77 (Mass. 2013) (discussing In re Sonic
Blue Inc.).
91
In re Sonic Blue Inc., 2008 WL 170562, at *9.
92
Id.
93
See infra Part II.B.1.
94
See infra Part II.B.2.
95
96 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996).
96
Id. at 1295.
97
Id.
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oral communications with the associates about the investigation.98 A
grand jury later undertook an investigation into the misconduct and
subpoenaed the associates.99 In response, the associates asserted the
firm’s attorney-client privilege.100
The district court rejected the associates’ claim.101 The judge
expressed unease about her ruling.102 Nevertheless, she ordered the
associates to testify:
According to the judge, who had spoken to the
associates in camera, “Basically, they were trusted
young associates [who] were asked to do some leg work
and
come
up
with
information . . . . [T]hey
were . . . helping out.”
The judge noted that the
associates were never told they were working as the
firm’s attorneys; that they didn’t bill the firm or record
hours expended on the firm’s behalf; and that, because
they were far less experienced than Rowe, “[t]hey were
certainly taking direction from him.”103
Rowe and the firm appealed from the district court order.104
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.105 At the outset of his
analysis, Judge Kozinski rejected two distinctions proposed by the
United States.106 First, the court held that a firm may invoke the
attorney-client privilege whether it consults in-house or an outside
firm.107 Next, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn Co.
v. United States,108 the court brushed aside the government’s contention
that the lawyer’s conduct of a factual investigation does not constitute
the rendition of “professional legal services.”109
Having repudiated those proposed distinctions, Judge Kozinski
found that Rowe and the associates had made out a plausible case that
the privilege attached.110 Although they were in-house counsel, the
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
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Id. at 1295–96.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1296–97.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1296–97 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
Id.
Id. at 1297.
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associates could qualify as counsel for the firm as a client.111 The court
conceded that the retention of outside counsel might make it easier for a
firm to show that it anticipated litigation; but on the facts in Rowe, “it
[was] clear that litigation was anticipated.”112 Thus, there was a
sufficient inference that the firm had initially sought counsel, that is, the
associates, for legal advice.113 Further, since Rowe had asked the
associates to “‘sift[] through the facts with an eye to the legally
relevant,’” the associates were acting in their capacity as attorneys for the
The Ninth Circuit
firm during their subsequent investigation.114
remanded to the district court for further factual findings rather than
finally upholding the privilege claim.115 However, the court made it
clear that at least in certain circumstances, a firm may assert the privilege
to protect intra-firm communications about the potential malpractice
claim of a person who was an outside client of the firm at the very time
of the communications.116
While the Rowe decision antedated Sonic Blue, three years after Sonic
Blue another federal court departed from the majority view. In 2011, a
federal District Court in Ohio handed down its decision in TattleTale
Alarm Systems, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP.117 The court argued
that the majority view has undesirable consequences.118 According to
the court, the majority view creates a significant disincentive for firm
members to consult with more experienced in-house counsel about
“rectif[ying] [an error] before the client is irreparably damaged. If such
lawyers believe that these communications will eventually be revealed to
the client in the context of a legal malpractice case, they will be much less
likely to seek prompt advice from members of the same firm.”119 In the
court’s view, in many if not most cases, immediate consultation with
experienced in-house counsel is likely to benefit the outside client.120
Especially when the firm has designated in-house counsel for these
Id.
Id. at 1296.
113
Id. at 1297 (“[H]e asked lawyers—not secretaries, paralegals, librarians or other of the
firm’s employees—to conduct the investigation . . . [thus] he is justified in expecting that
communications with these lawyers will be privileged.”).
114
Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390–91 (1981)).
115
Id. at 1297–98.
116
Gillers, supra note 32, at 109; see Sadler, supra note 10, at 861–64 (discussing the Rowe
opinion).
117
No. 2:10-cv-226, 2011 WL 382627 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011); see also RFF Family P’ship,
LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1072 (Mass. 2013) (discussing TattleTale
Alarm Sys.).
118
See infra text accompanying note 119 (presenting the court’s argument).
119
2011 WL 382627, at *5.
120
Id.
111
112
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purposes, the firm’s lawyers “should be encouraged to seek advice
promptly.”121 The veteran in-house counsel’s advice may enable the firm
members representing the outside client to moot the malpractice issue by
devising a better strategy to prevail for the client in the litigation or
transaction. The court implicitly criticized the Bank Brussels opinion,
stating that if the firm had to withdraw and seek its own outside counsel,
it may be too late to protect the [outside] client from damage.122 The
upshot is that as of 2011, there was a sharp split of authority over this
issue among the federal courts.
2.

State Authority

Two 2013 decisions—rendered within a day of each other—added to
the momentum toward the minority view. On July 10, 2013, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court handed down its decision in RFF
Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP.123 RFF contemplated making a
loan secured by what RFF thought would be a first mortgage on certain
real property.124 RFF hired the firm to investigate the property to ensure
that RFF could foreclose on the property if the borrower defaulted.125
When the borrower defaulted, RFF sued to foreclose; but, its foreclosure
action was enjoined when the assignee of another mortgage on the same
property claimed that its mortgage was superior to RFF’s.126 While the
firm was still representing RFF and seeking to obtain judicial
authorization of the foreclosure, RFF hired another law firm, Prince
Lobel Tye LLP.127 Prince sent the firm a notice that RFF considered the
firm guilty of malpractice on the ground that the firm had failed to
discover the existing, prior mortgage.128 At that point, the firm’s
attorneys representing RFF consulted with Rosenblatt, a firm partner
who had been designated to respond to ethical and risk management
issues.129 RFF later sued the firm for malpractice.130
121
Id. It is true that, in Rowe, the in-house counsel were relatively inexperienced
associates. See supra text accompanying note 97 (characterizing the in-house counsel as
young associates). However, firms’ liability insurers are now pressuring them to appoint
experienced counsel to advise junior firm members on matters of legal ethics and risk
management, including malpractice claims. See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1721–22
(explaining that using in-house counsel promotes better risk management and lowers the
cost of liability insurance).
122
TattleTale Alarm Sys., 2011 WL 382627, at *5.
123
991 N.E.2d 1066 (Mass. 2013).
124
Id. at 1068.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1068–69.
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When RFF noticed the deposition of the firm attorneys who had
represented RFF, the firm sought a protective order.131 The firm
contended that its attorney-client privilege protected any
communications between Rosenblatt and the firm attorneys representing
RFF about RFF’s potential malpractice claim.132 When the trial judge
entered the protective order, RFF appealed to the intermediate appellate
court.133 Since the Supreme Judicial Court believed that the case posed
an important issue, by its own motion the court transferred the case to its
docket.134
On appeal, RFF essentially asked the court to adopt the position
endorsed by Koen.135 As the Supreme Judicial Court stated:
RFF argues that when an attorney in a law firm seeks
legal advice from in-house counsel regarding how the
attorney or the firm should respond to a claim or
threatened claim of malpractice brought by a current
client, these communications are not protected from
disclosure to the client unless the law firm, before seeking
the advice, has either withdrawn from the
representation or fully disclosed to the client that the
law firm and client have a conflict of interest and
obtained the client’s informed consent for the law firm
to seek legal advice.136
After stating RFF’s argument, the court proceeded to reject the
argument based on policy and precedent. As a matter of policy, the
court agreed with TattleTale that the minority view encourages firm
members to seek advice from more experienced firm members about
potential malpractice claims and encouraging such conduct is in outside
clients’ interest.137 The court drew upon the assertion in TattleTale that
firm members who fear they may have harmed an outside client’s
interest ought to consult senior firm members who “may be better
schooled in ethical rules, and will almost certainly be better capable of
dispassionate analysis of the problem at hand.”138 Like the TattleTale
Id. at 1069.
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1069–70.
134
Id. at 1070.
135
Id. at 1075.
136
Id. at 1070.
137
Id. at 1072 (citing TattleTale Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No.
2:10-cv-226, 2011 WL 382627, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011)).
138
Id. at 1073.
130
131
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court, the Supreme Judicial Court doubted that firm members would
routinely consult senior firm counsel for this purpose if the members
realized that “the consultation may not remain private.”139
The court then undertook an analysis of the precedent governing the
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege. The court stated that,
in the typical situation in which a trustee uses trust funds to pay for an
attorney’s advice about trust management, “‘the beneficiaries [are] the
“real clients,”’” and the trustee therefore may not invoke the privilege to
prevent the beneficiaries from discovering the contents of the
communications between the trustee and the attorney.140 The court
noted that in 2011 in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,141 the U.S.
Supreme Court indicated that the trustee cannot invoke the privilege
against the beneficiary “when a trustee obtained legal advice to guide
the administration of the trust, and not for the trustee’s own defense in
litigation.”142
However, the Supreme Judicial Court distinguished the atypical case
where after a credible threat of litigation between the trustee and
beneficiaries has arisen, the trustee seeks legal advice to prepare a
defense and pays the lawyer.143 Although a person may have freely
agreed to serve as a trustee, he or she “‘is not completely debilitated’”
from taking steps “‘to defend’” himself or herself.144 A person does not
render himself or herself defenseless by agreeing to become a trustee.
The court noted that like a trustee, a lawyer has a right to self-defense.145
Indeed, A.B.A. Model Rule 1.6 even permits the lawyer to disclose the
client’s otherwise privileged communications when necessary to
establish the lawyer’s defense.146
In its next breath, though, the court imposed limitations on the scope
of the firm’s privilege for in-house consultations. Specifically, the court
prescribed “four conditions”: (1) the law firm must formally or
informally designate the attorney or attorneys within the firm who will
“represent the firm in matters as in-house or ethics counsel;” (2) the
attorney representing the firm must not have performed any work on the
outside client’s case or a substantially related matter; (3) the attorney’s
Id.
Id. at 1075 (quoting United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2322
(2011)).
141
131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
142
RFF Family P’ship, LP, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (quoting Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at
2321)).
143
Id. at 1075.
144
Id. (quoting United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1999)).
145
Id. at 1078–79.
146
Id. at 1079.
139
140
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time investigating the potential claim against the firm must be billed to
the firm rather than the outside client; and (4) the communications
between the attorneys representing the outside client and the in-house
counsel must be made in confidence and kept confidential.147
The very next day, July 11, 2013, the Georgia Supreme Court issued
its opinion in St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley &
Dunn, P.C.148 Like the RFF case, St. Simons adopts the minority view.149
St. Simon Waterfront (“SSW”) was interested in developing a
commercial real estate venture.150 SSW hired the firm to perform the
legal work related to the venture, including drafting the standard form
purchase contract.151 However, after a number of prospective buyers
had signed the contract, they notified SSW that they intended to rescind
because of several “alleged defects in the purchase contract.”152 In a
February 2008 conference call between SSW and the firm, SSW indicated
that it blamed the firm for the rescissions and would seek to hold it
responsible for any damages.153 After the call, the participating firm
members contacted Arnold Young, the firm’s in-house general
counsel.154 While the firm continued representing SSW, the firm
members representing SSW communicated with Young about SSW’s
In 2009, SSW sued the firm for
potential malpractice claim.155
malpractice.156 In the pretrial discovery phase, SSW attempted to depose
firm members concerning the in-house consultations about the
malpractice claim and demanded the production of documents reflecting
the consultations.157 The firm objected on the basis of the attorney-client
privilege and filed a privilege log supporting the objection.158
The trial judge overruled the objection.159 Following the majority
view, the judge reasoned that the in-house consultations created a
conflict of interest between the outside client’s and firm’s interests and

147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 1080.
746 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 2013).
See id. at 104 (discussing a number of authorities reaching the opposite result).
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 103.
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that the conflict “negated” the privilege.160 The firm appealed, and the
case eventually reached the state supreme court.161
After describing the procedural setting and the underlying facts, the
court acknowledged that there was a split of authority on the issue; and,
in its survey of the case law, the court identified three competing
views.162 The views span a wide spectrum: (1) one extreme position is
that the firm cannot claim a privilege against the outside client “under
any circumstances” if the attorney-client relationship with the client
existed at the time of the in-house consultations; (2) other courts hold
that “the privilege applies only in limited circumstances,” which include
such procedural safeguards as notifying the outside client of the fact of
the ongoing, in-house consultations; and (3) still another view is that
“the privilege does apply or that it applies with narrow exceptions.”163
Rather than formally adopting any of the competing views, the court
announced that “the best course is simply to analyze the privilege issue
here as we would in any other lawsuit in which the privilege is
asserted.”164 Like the RFF court, the court described the steps that the
firm should take to establish that the firm itself has become a client
entitled to the protection of the privilege. The court indicated the
following: The attorney advising the firm members representing the
outside client should not participate in the underlying representation;
the attorney ought to open a new file separate from the files for the
outside client’s case; the attorney must bill his or her time to the firm, not
the outside client; and the firm should designate the attorney as firm inhouse counsel with some “level of formality.”165 The court stated that
the ideal structural arrangement is one in which the designated counsel
“holds a full-time position as firm counsel to the exclusion of other
work.”166 The court stated that if the firm observed these practices, the
firm members could be deemed representatives of the firm as a client
consulting the in-house lawyer; the members would not be considered as
merely “consulting with a colleague as part of their representation of [an
outside] client or discussing general firm business.”167 If the firm follows
that practice, the firm would then have an opportunity to make a

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
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showing that all the normal requirements for the privilege, such as
confidentiality, have been satisfied.168
In the second half of the opinion, the court grappled with the tension
between the privilege and the firm’s ethical responsibilities to the outside
client. The court conceded that some courts had concluded that those
ethical duties trump the firm’s entitlement to the attorney-client
privilege.169 The court referred to the Koen theory that a fiduciary
exception precludes the firm from asserting the privilege for
communications relating to a potential malpractice claim by a then
current client.170
However, the court advanced two counter-arguments. The first was
that evidentiary and ethical rules can differ.171 In the court’s words, “this
opinion is not intended to resolve the ethical quandary and instead
addresses only the evidentiary questions of privilege.”172 The court
pointed to “our State Bar’s admonition that the Rules of Professional
Conduct are not intended to affect the law of privilege.”173 Assuming
that there is a fiduciary exception in legal ethics, the court “decline[d] to
adopt the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in this
context.”174 The court’s second counter-argument was that the firm is
not guilty of any unethical conduct unless the firm endeavors to mislead
the outside client about the in-house consultations.175 In dictum, the
court stated that “to the extent there is an allegation that in-house
counsel has been employed by firm attorneys in an effort to defraud
rather than merely defend against a client, the privilege” would be
unavailable.176 There was no such allegation in the Georgia case.
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE THRESHOLD POLICY QUESTION OF
WHETHER A FIRM SHOULD EVER ENJOY A PRIVILEGE PROTECTING INTERNAL
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN IN-HOUSE COUNSEL AND THE COUNSEL
REPRESENTING A CURRENT CLIENT WHO HAS INDICATED THAT IT MAY SUE
THE FIRM FOR MALPRACTICE
In Part II, this Article demonstrated that the courts are sharply
divided over the questions of whether, and in what circumstances, a law

168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id. at 106.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 106 n.4.
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Id.
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firm may invoke the attorney-client privilege to protect internal
consultations between an in-house counsel and the firm members
representing an outside client when the subject of the consultation is a
potential claim by the then current client.177 This Part addresses the
threshold policy question of whether a firm should ever be able to assert
the privilege against such an outside client. First, Part III.A discusses
situations where an attorney’s duty of confidentiality is excused to
obtain legal advice about compliance with the ethical rules, or where the
lawyer needs to defend himself against a claim.178 Next, Part III.B
analyzes the different ethical and policy considerations relevant to the
propriety of treating a law firm as its own client when determining
whether the firm enjoys a privilege.179
A. The Case for Granting the Firm a Privilege
When an outside client threatens a malpractice suit, the law firm
undeniably has substantial interests, both financial and reputational, at
stake. If the former client prevails in a malpractice action, the firm could
suffer an adverse judgment in the millions.180 Even if the former client
does not sue, unfavorable publicity for the potential claim can damage
the firm’s reputation and reduce its future ability to attract clientele.
The rules of legal ethics reflect that these are legitimate interests
worthy of legal protection.181 In particular, two provisions of A.B.A.
Model Rule 1.6 reflect the bar’s recognition of the legitimacy of the
interests. Rule 1.6 governs the attorney’s duty of confidentiality to the
client.182 Rule 1.6(a) prescribes that the attorney generally has a duty to
maintain the confidentiality of information relating to the client’s
representation.183 However, Rule 1.6(b) lists a number of exceptions to
the general rule.184 Rule 1.6(b)(4) provides that the attorney may disclose
otherwise confidential information “to secure legal advice about the

See supra Part II.
See infra Part III.A.
179
See infra Part III.B.
180
See VAIL & EWINS, supra note 3, at 14 tbl.7A (identifying fifty-two cases between 2007
and 2011 when a client won $1,000,000 or more from a malpractice action).
181
See, e.g., RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1078
(Mass. 2013) (explaining the interests embodied in Rule 1.10); see also Chambliss, supra note
2, at 1753 (referencing Rule 1.6).
182
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2011); see Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Are Law
Clerks Fair Game? Invading Judicial Confidentiality, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 39 n.184 (2008)
(discussing Rule 1.6).
183
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011).
184
Id. at R. 1.6(b); Stephen Gillers, Virtual Clients: An Idea in Search of a Theory (with
Limits), 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 797, 806 (2008).
177
178
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lawyer’s compliance with these Rules.”185 Further, Rule 1.6(b)(5)
explicitly provides that the attorney may disclose such information “to
establish a . . . defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client.”186 Official Comment 11 states that Rule
1.6(b)(5) extends to fee disputes with the client when the lawyer is
attempting to protect his or her financial interests.187
These provisions implicitly recognize the magnitude of the firm’s
interests. In the type of dispute that is our principal focus, the question
is whether the former outside client can discover the firm’s own internal
consultations about the malpractice claim. In contrast, Rule 1.6(b)
enumerates situations in which the lawyer has the right to disclose the
client’s own privileged communications over the client’s protest.188 The
outside client has a more intense interest in the privacy of its own
communications. If the lawyer’s reputational and financial interests are
substantial enough to defeat the client’s confidentiality expectation in its
own communications, there is all the more reason to conclude that those
interests warrant extending a privilege to the firm’s internal
communications in which the outside client did not participate at all.
Similarly situated entities enjoy a privilege to protect their
comparable interests. A law firm is a business organization.189 It is well
settled that business partnerships and associations can qualify as holders
of the attorney-client privilege.190 Indeed, one of the leading cases
following the majority view, Sunrise, recognized that point of law.191
California’s statutory provisions are illustrative. California Evidence
Code section 951 governing the attorney-client privilege defines “client”
as any “person” consulting an attorney for legal advice.192 In turn,
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2011).
Id. at R. 1.6(b)(5).
187
Id. at R. 1.6(b)(5) cmt. 11.
188
Id. at R. 1.6(b).
189
Sadler, supra note 10, at 867.
190
See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.5.1, at 557–58 (discussing the attorney-client
privilege available to entities such as associations, corporations, and government agencies);
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1728–29 (discussing cases recognizing a privilege for in-house
counsel); Gillers, supra note 32, at 107 (“It is settled law that the attorney client privilege
protects communications between corporate directors, officers or employees and in-house
corporate counsel.”); Sadler, supra note 10, at 866 (recognizing that the A.B.A. treats
partnerships, corporations, and other legal entities the same under Rule 1.13); see also John
Hasnas, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel in the World of
the Holder Memorandum, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1199, 1210 (2010) (discussing ethical issues
regarding the corporate attorney-client privilege).
191
In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1989)) (“[A] law firm, like other
business or professional association [may] receive the benefit of the attorney client
privilege when seeking legal advice from in-house counsel.”).
192
CAL. EVID. CODE § 951 (West 2009).
185
186
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section 175 defines a person as “includ[ing] a natural person, firm,
association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation . . . or
public entity.”193 Given the breadth of this rule and the substantiality of
the firm’s legitimate interests, the RFF court found “‘no principled
reason’” for denying a privilege to the firm for its internal consultations
about potential malpractice claims.194
B. The Case Against Granting a Privilege
That, of course, is the key policy issue: Is there a principled
distinction between a law firm and a non-legal partnership that does
enjoy a privilege? The proponents of the traditional, majority view have
urged two bases for recognizing a distinction. The first basis for
recognizing a distinction that opponents of the privilege rely on is the
conceptual objection of treating a law firm as its own client.195 The
second basis relied on is the ethical objection of treating a law firm as its
own client.196
1.

The Conceptual Objection to Treating a Law Firm as Its Own Client

Several courts following the majority view have professed that they
cannot understand how a law firm can at once be the attorney for the
outside client as well as its own client. As we saw in Part II.A, the
McCormick court asked rhetorically: “If the McCormick firm was the
client, who was its lawyer?”197 The Sunrise court voiced the same doubt
when it questioned how the firm as lawyer and the firm as client could
be represented by attorneys who are members of “one and the same
entity.”198
However, this conceptual argument does not establish the logical
impossibility of treating some firm members as client (the attorneys
representing the outside client) at the same time that another firm
member (the in-house counsel) serves as attorney. In rejecting the
argument, the Rowe court analogized to the law governing the privilege
between corporations and their in-house counsel.199 It is true that some
CAL. EVID. CODE § 175 (West 2011).
RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1072 (Mass. 2013)
(quoting Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 850 F.Supp. 255, 255
(S.D.N.Y 1994)).
195
See infra Part III.B.1.
196
See infra Part III.B.2.
197
Gillers, supra note 32, at 110.
198
In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Chambliss, supra note 2, at
1728 (quoting In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 572).
199
United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996); Sadler, supra note 10, at 860.
193
194
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European countries do not recognize a legal privilege between a
corporate entity and its in-house counsel.200 However, in the United
States the law is to the contrary.201 Under domestic American law, a
corporate client can have an attorney-client relationship with one of its
own employees, that is, its paid in-house counsel.202 In 1915, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that an in-house counsel can qualify as the attorney
for the purposes of creating an attorney-client relationship with his or
her corporate employer.203 “At the present time, all jurisdictions within
the United States, both state and federal, recognize the attorney-client
privilege for in-house counsel.”204
In the situation described in the preceding paragraph, the corporate
entity constitutes the client while an employee of the entity, the in-house
counsel, functions as attorney. One natural person employee, the inhouse counsel, provides legal services to other natural person corporate
employees, who personify the entity client. Similarly, although a law
firm usually serves as attorney for outside clients, the firm can don the
hat of client and enter into a privileged attorney-client relationship with
one of its own members, the designated firm counsel. Here too one
natural person member, the designated counsel, furnishes legal advice to
other natural person members, the firm attorneys representing the
outside client. The existence of the artificial entity should not obscure
the human reality that different natural persons are performing the
attorney and client roles. In a very real sense, there is a division of labor.
Hence, logic does not dictate denying a law firm a privilege for its
internal consultations between in-house counsel and the firm members
representing an outside client. If the privilege is to be denied, it must be
done on more substantial policy grounds.
2.

The Ethical Objection to Treating a Law Firm as Its Own Client

The second basis relied on by opponents of treating law firms as
their own client and granting them privilege is ethical. The proponent’s
arguments and critiques of their arguments will be discussed in the
following paragraphs.205

200
See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, §12.2, at 1658 n.1 (discussing the approach to inhouse counsel and attorney-client privilege used by several European countries).
201
1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.9.1, at 824–25.
202
Id.
203
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
204
Joseph Pratt, Comment, The Parameters of the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House
Counsel at the International Level: Protecting the Company’s Confidential Information, 20 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 145, 152 (1999).
205
See infra Part III.B.2.a–b.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015], Art. 8

738
a.

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

The Proponents’ Arguments

The proponents of the majority view contend that there are such
grounds, based on legal ethics. They advance a formal argument as well
as a more fundamental argument based on the policies inspiring legal
ethical rules.
The formal argument is that treating the firm as its own client
violates the A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct by creating an
unethical conflict of interest for the in-house counsel advising the firm
members representing the outside client. A.B.A. Model Rule 1.7(a)(1)
declares that an attorney may not “concurrent[ly]” represent two clients
when “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another
client.”206 Model Rule 1.10 announces a general rule that when one firm
member is disqualified from representing a client, the other members of
the same firm are vicariously disqualified from doing so.207 The
proponents of the majority view point to those two rules and argue
along these lines: The firm members representing the outside client
certainly cannot directly oppose the client’s interests—as the outside
client’s counsel, they are personally disqualified from doing so;
ordinarily, a personal conflict of one firm member is automatically
imputed to other firm members; if the personal conflict of the members
representing the outside client is vicariously imputed to the firm’s inhouse counsel, that counsel must be deemed to be simultaneously
representing and opposing the outside client; and the latter, in-house
firm counsel therefore has a disqualifying, actual conflict of interest.208
The Bank Brussels court encapsulated this line of argument when it
asserted that “a conflict as to one attorney at a firm [the member
representing the outside client] is a conflict as to all [including the inhouse counsel purporting to represent the firm itself].”209

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2013).
Id. at R. 1.10.
208
See In re SonicBlue, Inc., No. 03-51775, 2008 WL 170562, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Bankr. Ct.
Jan. 18, 2008); RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1077–78
(Mass 2013) (discussing and rejecting RFF’s argument that Rosenblatt should have been
simultaneously representing the firm itself and “imputed[ly] represent[ing] RFF” (citing In
re Sunrise Sec. Litig. 130 F.R.D. 560, 597–98 (E.D. Pa. 1989)); see also St. Simons Waterfront,
LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 105 (Ga. 2013) (“This automatic
imputation of one attorney’s conflicts to all other attorneys in the firm is the basis on which
some courts have refused to recognize any privilege for intra-firm communications.”
(citing Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)); Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1724 (explaining the denial of privilege based
on the arguments for conflict of interest “by imputing the firm’s duty to the client to inhouse counsel as a member of the firm”).
209
Bank Brussels Lambert, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
206
207
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At a more fundamental level, the proponents of the traditional view
contend that the conflict rules are intended to enforce the firm’s duty of
loyalty to the outside client. Koen is an eloquent statement of the
contention. After discussing the formal conflict rules set out in
Pennsylvania’s version of Model Rule 1.7, the court cites Sunrise and
rests its decision squarely on the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the client.210
Faced with a policy choice between enforcing those duties and
protecting the firm’s interests, the court stated that those fiduciary duties
are “paramount.”211
b.

The Critique of the Proponents’ Arguments

Although the proponents’ arguments seem plausible, there are
persuasive responses to the proponent’s formal argument as well as their
policy argument. Professor Chambliss has presented a critique of the
formal argument.212 In its 2013 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court endorsed Professor Chambliss’s criticism of the
traditionalists’ construction of the Model Rules.213
Her analysis
convinced the court that in the typical case, it does not significantly serve
either the firm’s duty of loyalty or the outside client’s confidentiality
interests to “apply[] the [formal] rule of [vicarious] imputation to the
representation of a law firm by its in-house counsel.”214
She begins her critique by noting that the commentary and judicial
gloss on the conflict rules demonstrate that those rules are intended
primarily as means of enforcing the attorney’s duties of confidentiality
and loyalty to the client.215 She explains that neither ethical duty
requires the vicarious imputation of the conflict of the firm members
representing the outside client to the firm’s in-house counsel.216 Her
analysis of the confidentiality rationale for the conflict rules is trenchant.
As she observes, the foremost rationale for the confidentiality duty is to
prevent the attorney from disclosing the client’s confidential information
In her mind, it makes little sense to treat
to third parties.217
confidentiality as a rationale for the automatic imputation, since

210
Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C.,
212 F.R.D. 283, 285–86 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
211
Id. at 286.
212
See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1724 (arguing for broad protection of communication
with a law firm’s in-house counsel).
213
RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1071–72.
214
Id. at 1078.
215
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1747–48.
216
Id.
217
Id.
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affiliated lawyers in the same firm already have access to the firm’s files
containing client confidences.218
She also addresses the duty of loyalty. She notes that the Model
Rules recognize the firm’s right of self-defense—a right that would even
permit the firm to disclose the outside client’s own privileged
communications in which the outside client obviously has an intense
privacy interest.219 As she writes, “the firm’s duty of loyalty to the client
does not prevent the firm from attempting to defend against client
claims. This effort to defend is no more ‘disloyal’ when it involves inside
rather than outside counsel.”220 Although there is merit to this part of
her critique, it is not wholly satisfying. While the firm has a right “to
defend [itself] against client claims,”221 she glosses over the difference
between the firm’s well-settled right to defend itself after the client
terminates its services and the firm’s more debatable entitlement to take
defensive measures while it still represents the client. Intuitively, there
would appear to be a distinction. To come to grips with that distinction,
we must turn to the traditionalists’ more fundamental argument based
on the firm’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to a current client.
The traditionalists’ reliance on the attorney’s fiduciary duty is
misplaced. The traditionalists are correct in pointing out that when in a
classic trust relationship, the trustee spends trust funds to hire an
attorney to advise the trustee on the regular management of the corpus,
the courts treat the cestui que trust (the beneficiary) as the real client and
prevent the trustee from asserting the attorney-client privilege against
the beneficiary. In 2011 in the Jicarilla Apache Nation case, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that generalization but noted that even today
“[s]ome state courts have altogether rejected the notion that the attorneyclient privilege is subject to a fiduciary exception.”222
But even positing the existence of the exception, the traditionalists’
analysis of the case law is incomplete. The generalization they rely on is
merely the starting point in the analysis. As the Jicarilla Court noted, the
origin of the fiduciary exception is traceable to conventional trust
cases.223 However, many of the modern cases are Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) lawsuits involving the
administration of pension trust funds.224 There is a wealth of ERISA case
Id. at 1748.
Id. at 1753.
220
Id. at 1748.
221
Id.
222
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2321 n.3 (2011).
223
See id. at 2332–33 (providing a historical review of the fiduciary exception
jurisprudence).
224
1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.5.1.a(2), at 626 & n.97.
218
219
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law analyzing the question of when the pension fund trustee may invoke
the attorney-client privilege against the beneficiaries.225 The cases apply
the fiduciary exception to the trustee’s communications with the trust
counsel at the inception of the trust when there is a cooperative
relationship between the trustee and the pensioner beneficiaries.226
However, the cases recognize that at some point, it may become
reasonably clear to the trustee that its interests have diverged from those
of the beneficiary.227 For example, the trustee might conclude that the
beneficiary contemplates suing the trustee for mismanagement. Under
the modern case law, when the trustee forms that belief, the trustee has a
perfect right to hire counsel at the trustee’s own expense to prepare for
any possible litigation; and the attorney-client privilege will shield the
communications between the trustee and its counsel from the
beneficiaries.228 Significantly, the privilege applies even though the
trustee consults its counsel while the trustee-beneficiary relationship
continues.
The parallel to the intra-firm privilege issue is evident. When in one
way or another the outside client indicates that he or she may sue the
firm for malpractice, the interests of the outside client and the firm have
diverged. At that point, under the modern fiduciary exception case law
the firm may seek counsel to prepare for the outside client’s possible
lawsuit against the firm.229 The Jicarilla case stated that an important clue
to the client’s identity is the payor of the attorney’s fee.230 In Justice
Alito’s words, “[c]ourts look to the source of funds as a ‘strong indicator
of precisely who the real clients were’ and a ‘significant factor’ in
determining who ought to have access to the legal advice.”231 If the law
firm instructs its in-house counsel to bill his or her time investigating the
malpractice claim to the firm rather than the client, the instruction is
In these
important evidence that the firm is the real client.232
circumstances, consistently with the ERISA case law, the firm may claim
the privilege even against the person or company who was the firm’s

See id. § 6.5.1.a(2), at 626 n.97 (citing a plethora of cases on this issue).
Id.
227
See generally, Kirsten H. Jensen, The Fiduciary Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
PRAC. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 31, 32–34, 40–42 (Oct. 2007) (discussing the fiduciary exception
and divergent interests).
228
1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.5.1.a(2), at 625–26.
229
See supra Part II.B. (providing case law on the growing minority view recognizing an
attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel).
230
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330 (2011).
231
Id. at 2326 (quoting Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709,
712 (Del. Ch. 1976)).
232
RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1075 (Mass. 2013).
225
226
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outside client at the time of the internal consultations.233 The upshot is
that the firm has legitimate, substantial interests warranting the
protection of the attorney-client privilege, and none of the traditionalists’
counter-arguments can withstand close scrutiny.
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE
INTRA-FIRM PRIVILEGE: WHAT CONDITIONS SHOULD THE COURT IMPOSE TO
LIMIT THE EXTENT OF THE PRIVILEGE?
Part III concluded that at least in some circumstances, a law firm
should be able to assert the attorney-client privilege for communications
between the firm’s in-house counsel and the firm members representing
an outside client about a potential malpractice claim even when the
party later seeking discovery is the former outside client.234 However,
even assuming that an intra-firm privilege of some sort should exist, the
question remains: What should be its extent or scope?235 In what
specific circumstances should the courts recognize the privilege?236
First, this section argues which internal steps a firm should take to
establish its identity as the client of its in-house counsel.237 Second, it
explains what the firm’s external relations with the outside client should
entail.238
A. The Internal Steps the Firm Should Take to Establish Its Identity as the
Client of Its In-House Counsel
In the 2013 Georgia and Massachusetts decisions, the state supreme
courts underscored that the firm ought to implement procedures to
ensure that both the firm’s in-house counsel and the firm members
representing the outside client understand that the client of the in-house
counsel is the firm itself.239 The firm must put in place appropriate
structural arrangements.240 Admittedly, both decisions are so recent that
E.g., id.
See sufra Part III.
235
See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1748 (suggesting that the scope of the in-firm privilege
“vis-à-vis current clients should turn on the facts of the representation at issue”); Sadler,
supra note 10, at 873 (“Rowe leaves unanswered the question as to the extent of the privilege
when the communication directly related to the client who is seeking discovery.”).
236
See Sadler, supra note 10, at 867–68 (expounding on this question).
237
See infra Part IV.A.
238
See infra Part IV.B.
239
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98,
104–05 (Ga. 2013); RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1071–
72 (Mass. 2013).
240
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1745–50 (discussing courts’ treatment of this issue and
proposing a structural approach).
233
234
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it would be premature to predict the final form of the required
procedures and structures. However, both courts expressed relatively
strong preferences on four structural arrangements.
First, the firm should formally or informally designate the in-house
counsel as the attorney whom firm members are to consult about ethical
problems such as potential malpractice claims by current clients.241 It
would be ideal if the firm formalized the counsel’s role by (1) selecting
an attorney to serve in the role in a permanent, full-time basis with no
outside practice; and (2) giving the attorney a title signaling his or her
special role.242 The next best arrangement would be to designate an
attorney who serves as firm counsel on a part-time but ongoing basis.243
However, a court might be willing to extend the privilege even when the
attorney was designated on an ad hoc basis,244 as the San Diego firm
appointed the two associates in United States v. Rowe.245 In Rowe, Rowe
appointed the two associates to investigate the alleged mishandling of
client funds even though they had never before functioned as counsel for
Nevertheless, Judge Kozinski characterized them as
the firm.246
“effectively . . . in-house counsel.”247 However, as a practical matter a
court is much more likely to find an affirmative understanding that the
in-house attorney’s client was the firm itself when the firm goes to the
trouble to select experienced counsel and institutionalize a more formal
arrangement.248
The second procedure is negative in nature. Before the time when
the firm formed the belief that the outside client might sue for
malpractice, the attorney in question should not have participated in the
client’s representation;249 and once the firm forms that belief, the attorney

St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 104–05; RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080.
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1733.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
96 F.3d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996).
246
Id.
247
Id. at 1296.
248
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1733. In a provocative comment on the draft of this Article,
Mr. Mokriski suggested that there might be a stronger argument for recognizing the
privilege if the firm counsel was an employee rather than a partner. E-mail from Charles J.
Mokriski, Prof’l Responsibility Proskauer Law Firm, to Edward J. Imwinkelried, Edward J.
Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Davis Sch. of Law (Sept. 19, 2013, 09:45 PST) (on
file with author). It could be argued that as a mere employee, the counsel would have less
of a stake in the outcome of the potential malpractice claim. Id.
249
RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 (Mass. 2013);
Habte, supra note 7, at 1762.
241
242
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certainly ought not to participate in the representation.250 The in-house
attorney is undertaking to advise the firm—a representation distinct
from the other attorneys’ representation of the outside client.251
The third and fourth procedural requirements flow from the prior
two. The third is that the in-house counsel should open a new file
separate from the file for the outside client.252 After opening the new file,
the in-house counsel should ensure that the documents for the two
distinct representations are not commingled.253 In the words of the
Georgia Supreme Court, this records practice “helps distinguish the firm
as the in-house counsel’s client and the claim against the firm as a matter
independent of the underlying representation.”254
The fourth and final requirement is a billing practice. Rather than
billing the client for the in-house counsel’s services,255 the firm ought to
assign a separate billing number;256 and all the charges allocable to that
number must be billed to the firm itself.257 As previously stated, in its
2011 Jicarilla Apache Nation decision, the U.S. Supreme Court observed
that the identity of the payor is “a ‘strong indicator of precisely who the
real clients’” are.258
If the firm adopts these four internal practices and both the in-house
counsel and the attorneys representing the outside client are aware of
these practices, there is a strong case that the firm itself has established
its status as the in-house counsel’s client. To be sure, subsidiary issues
will arise as the courts refine the understanding of these practices and
shape their final form.259 However, the major remaining policy question
250
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1732. As a corollary to the in-house counsel’s noninvolvement in the representation of the outside client, the counsel should not share in any
fee paid by the outside client. Id. at 1745.
251
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98,
104–05 (Ga. 2013). In another comment on the draft of this Article, Mr. Mokriski asked:
“[S]hould the lawyers involved as targets of potential malpractice claims, who are
continuing to represent the client . . . be privy to the advice of the firm counsel, or should
they be screened from it[?]” E-mail from Charles J. Mokriski, supra note 248.
252
Gillers, supra note 32, at 109; Habte, supra note 7, at 1762.
253
St. Simons Waterfront., 746 S.E.2d at 105.
254
Id.
255
RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 (Mass. 2013).
256
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1749; Gillers, supra note 32, at 111.
257
RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“Because the law firm is the client . . . , their cost
must be borne by the law firm.”).
258
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2326 (2011) (quoting Riggs
Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. Ch. 1976)); see E-mail
from Charles J. Mokriski, supra note 248 (questioning the realism of the condition, since
“[c]ompensation setting for partners in law firms is so complex and arbitrary that it is
difficult to trace client fee revenues to any member of the firm.”).
259
See generally E-mail from Charles J. Mokriski, supra note 248 (identifying several of
those questions).
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becomes whether, in its external relations with the outside client, the
firm has conducted itself in a manner that justifies requiring the outside
client to respect the firm’s internal confidential consultations. Part IV.B
turns to that question.260
B. The Firm’s External Relations with the Outside Client
Just as there is general consensus on the internal procedures that the
firm should follow to claim an intra-firm privilege, there is agreement on
some of the things the firm must do to fulfill its professional
responsibilities to the outside client. To begin, if the client does not
realize that an event has occurred that may give rise to a malpractice
claim against the firm, the firm must notify the client of the existence of
the potential claim.261 Of course, when the firm makes this disclosure to
the outside client, the firm should also explain that the client has the
right to consult independent counsel about the validity and pursuit of
the potential claim.262
However, there the consensus ends. At this point, the troublesome
question arises: Before consulting in-house counsel about the claims
(and becoming entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege), must the
firm seek and obtain the outside client’s consent to the firm’s internal
consultations about a defense against the potential claim? That question
is reducible to two sub-issues.263
1.

If It Becomes Clear that the Outside Client May Sue the Firm for
Malpractice, Does that Development Ipso Facto Create an Actual
Conflict of Interest Requiring the Firm to Obtain the Client’s Consent
Before Conducting Internal Consultations Between the Attorneys

See infra Part IV.B.
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1754; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 20 cmt. c (2000) (“If the lawyer’s conduct of the matter gives the client a
substantial malpractice claim against the lawyer, the lawyer must disclose that to the
client.”).
262
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (3) (“A
lawyer . . . must explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).
263
See infra Part IV.B.1 (posing the question: “If it becomes clear that the outside client
may sue the firm for malpractice, does that development ipso facto create an actual conflict
of interest requiring the firm to obtain the client’s consent before conducting internal
consultations between the attorneys representing the client and the firm’s in-house counsel
about the malpractice issue?”); infra Part IV.B.2 (asking: “If an actual conflict of interest
arises but the firm fails to obtain the outside client’s consent to internal consultations about
the potential malpractice claim, does the failure preclude the firm from later claiming an
attorney-client privilege covering the consultations?”).
260
261

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015], Art. 8

746

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Representing the Client and the Firm’s In-House Counsel About the
Malpractice Issue?
One of the recurring themes in the cases advocating the traditional,
majority view is that when the outside client indicates that it
contemplates suing the firm for malpractice, an actual conflict of interest
arises between the client and the firm. The Koen decision is a case in
point. Early in the opinion, the court pointed to the conflict of interest
rules set out in Pennsylvania Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7,
modeled after the A.B.A. Model Rule.264 The court found that when the
firm members representing the Koen company sought legal advice from
“another lawyer inside the firm” about the company’s potential claim, a
conflict arose that “vitiated” any privilege claim by the firm.265 Likewise,
the earlier Sunrise court relied on Rule 1.7 as an essential premise of its
decision.266
Given the central role of the conflict rules under the majority view, it
is important to examine the precise terms of Model Rule 1.7. Rule 1.7(a)
identifies the situations in which a disqualifying conflict exists. The
current version of Rule 1.7(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.267
The official Comments to Rule 1.7 elaborate on the meaning of the
provisions. For instance, Comment 6 explains that (a)(1) comes into play
when the lawyer “act[s] as an advocate in one matter against a person

264
Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C.,
212 F.R.D. 283, 285 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
265
Id.
266
In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 597–98 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Chambliss, supra note 2,
at 1735–36; Sadler, supra note 10, at 872.
267
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2012).
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the lawyer represents in some other matter.”268 Comment 8 elaborates
on (a)(2):
Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of
interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an
appropriate course of action for the client will be
materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other
responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer
asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a
joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the
lawyer’s ability to recommend or advocate all possible
positions that each might take because of the lawyer’s
duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect
forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available
to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm
does not itself require disclosure and consent. The
critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in
interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will
materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent
professional judgment in considering alternatives or
foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be
pursued on behalf of the client.269
Commenting on the definition of conflict of interest in the analogous
Sixth Amendment context, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stated that the key to finding a conflict is identifying a plausible
alternative strategy that the competing interest might prompt the
attorney not to pursue.270
How do the conflict rules apply to the scenario in which the outside
client is threatening to sue or suing the firm for malpractice? If the
outside client has already filed a malpractice lawsuit against the firm,
there certainly is an actual conflict of interest between the outside client
and the firm under Rule 1.7(a)(1); they are the named, opposing plaintiff
and defendant in the same lawsuit.
However, when the outside client has not yet filed suit but has
threatened to sue, Rule 1.7(a)(2) does not dictate the conclusion that there
is already a conflict. Assume, for example, that the outside client

Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 8.
270
Plunk v. Hobbs, 719 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Noe v. United States, 601 F.3d
784, 790 (8th Cir. 2010)).
268
269
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expresses its dissatisfaction with the firm’s services very late in the
representation—after pretrial discovery has closed, after trial has been
scheduled, after the judge has entered his or her pretrial order including
the parties’ final stipulations, after the two sides have submitted their
formal witnesses lists, and after the opposition has indicated that it is no
longer interested in pursuing settlement negotiations.271 The outside
client’s grumbling undeniably creates a tension between the client and
the firm, but in the words of Comment 8 “the critical question[]” is
whether the firm’s concern about the malpractice claim could affect its
“professional judgment in considering alternative[]” strategies.272 At this
late point in the litigation, the firm may have no alternatives; as a
practical matter the firm is locked into a theory of the case and a set of
witnesses with which to establish that theory. No matter how explicit
the outside client’s threat to later sue for malpractice if the firm loses,
unless it withdraws the firm’s only option is to pursue its chosen
strategy—to prevail on that theory of the case and hopefully moot the
malpractice issue.
The analysis becomes more complex, though, if the outside client
raises the possibility of a malpractice action earlier in the litigation when
the firm members representing the client still have a choice among
alternative strategies. Even then, though, there is not necessarily a
disqualifying conflict. A conflict arises only when there is a plausible
“link[]” between the firm’s alleged neglect and the firm’s choice among
the alternative strategies for representing the outside client.273 Suppose,
for example, that the outside client contends that the firm was negligent
in preparing to depose an opposing expert. The client asserts that the
firm attorneys deposing the expert were woefully unprepared and
wasted the time and money attributable to the deposition. However, the
opposing litigant later announces that it does not intend to call that
expert at trial. The outside client may have a malpractice claim against
the firm to recover the fees paid in connection with the deposition, and
the client’s threat to press the claim unquestionably introduces an
element of tension in the relationship between the client and the firm.
Yet, since that expert will not appear at trial, it is hard to see how that
tension can influence the firm’s selection of strategies or tactics for
representing the client. Tension or not, without more there does not
appear to be a disqualifying conflict under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2).

271
E.g., Breezevale, Ltd. v. Dickinson, 759 A.2d 627, 631–32 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated, 769
A.2d 133 (D.D.C. 2001).
272
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2012).
273
Plunk, 719 F.3d at 981 (quoting Noe v. United States, 601 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2010)).
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However, varying the facts again, now suppose that the opposing
litigant does not withdraw the expert. Rather, as trial approaches, it
becomes evident that the opposition views that expert as its star witness.
Moreover, assume that on the eve of trial, the firm realizes that there are
several different ways of attempting to undermine the expert’s
testimony.274 One of the possible modes of attack is the type of
impeachment that the firm used unsuccessfully at the expert’s pretrial
deposition. Again, the outside client has indicated that it believes that
the firm attorneys representing the client were inadequately prepared to
develop that impeachment at the deposition. Given the threat of the
malpractice claim, the firm might be tempted to resort to that
impeachment at trial to show that even if the attack were fully
developed, it would not undercut the expert; if the record demonstrated
that, the malpractice claim would lack merit. At trial, the firm attorneys
could combine that mode of impeachment with other attacks on the
expert’s testimony, which they believe could succeed. In any event, in
this variation of the scenario, the spectre of the malpractice lawsuit
might influence the firm’s choice among alternative strategies and could,
thus, create a genuine conflict of interest. At the very least, that
possibility could impact the attorney’s advice concerning the advisability
of settlement.275
2.

If an Actual Conflict of Interest Arises but the Firm Fails to Obtain
the Outside Client’s Consent to Internal Consultations About the
Potential Malpractice Claim, Does the Failure Preclude the Firm
from Later Claiming an Attorney-Client Privilege Covering the
Consultations?

While Model Rule 1.7(a) identifies the situations in which the lawyer
has an otherwise disqualifying conflict, Rule 1.7(b) states the
consequences of the existence of a conflict.276 Rule 1.7(b) prescribes the
requirements for the lawyer’s continued representation of the client.
Rule 1.7(b) reads:

See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE (5th ed. 2014) (providing a detailed analysis of the methods of attacking “the
admissibility, weight, and legal sufficiency of opposing expert testimony”).
275
See, e.g., Breezevale Ltd., 759 A.2d at 632 (setting forth the client’s argument that
advising settlement without informing the client of the firm’s conflict of interest constituted
malpractice).
276
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2012) (providing instances where an
attorney may represent a client despite a concurrent conflict); supra text accompanying note
267 (setting forth the text of Rule 1.7(a)).
274
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Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a
client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be
able to provide competent and diligent representation to
each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a
claim by one client against another client represented by
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding
before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.277
Rule 1.7(b)(2) and (3) do not require extended comment. Without
more, (b)(2) does not apply in the situation in which the outside client
has indicated that it might later sue the firm for malpractice, as
Comment 16 to Rule 1.7 explains that (b)(2) applies only in extreme
situations such as when a lawyer seeks to represent more than one
defendant in a capital case.278
Similarly, (b)(3) is inapposite. In the words of Comment 17, at the
point when the outside client threatens, but has not filed a claim, the
outside client and firm are not yet “aligned directly against each other in
the same litigation or other proceeding.”279 For that matter, consistently
with (b)(1) if the firm “reasonably believes” that it can provide the
outside client with “competent . . . representation” against the outside
client’s opponent, even that provision does not bar the firm’s continued
representation of the outside client.280
By process of elimination, (b)(4) emerges as the decisive issue: Did
the firm obtain the outside’s client’s express consent? What exactly does
the client need to consent to? In this setting, the firm supposedly must
obtain the outside client’s consent that the firm members representing
the client confer with in-house firm counsel,281 and it must obtain that
counsel’s legal advice about the appropriate course of action in light of

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(2) (2012).
Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 16.
279
Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 17.
280
Id. at R. 1.7(b)(1).
281
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1746, 1752; see RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson,
LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Mass. 2013) (presenting the outside client’s argument to that
effect).
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/8

Imwinkelried: Preliminary Thoughts on an Attorney-Client Privilege for Law Firm

2014] Preliminary Thoughts on an Attorney-Client Privilege 751
the threatened malpractice claim.282 Given the asserted requirement for
consent, several practical and legal issues arise.
After concluding that the firm might have committed malpractice,
why might the outside client want the firm to continue to represent the
client? The lawyer-client relationship is simply one type of human
relationship. Persons and companies standing in relationships often
decide to continue the relationship after encountering “bumps in the
road.” Spouses do so, employers and employees do so, doctors and
patients do so, and businesses in contractual relationships do so. Even
after a minor breach by the other contracting party, a business might
conduct a cost/benefit analysis and conclude that the long-term
economic value of maintaining the contract far exceeds the paltry
amount of damage caused by the minor breach.
In this context, it is easy to conceive of realistic circumstances in
which the outside client would desperately want the firm to continue the
representation. It could be a foolish, knee-jerk reaction for the outside
client to terminate the firm as soon as the client concludes that the firm
has committed an act of malpractice. Assume that the law firm has more
expertise at this type of transaction or litigation than any other firm, the
firm has spent months or years collecting the facts and conducting the
relevant legal research, and the hour is late—the trial is scheduled to
begin soon, or the other party to the business transaction has signaled
that it wants to conclude the negotiations shortly. All those factors could
pressure the outside client to favor the continuation of the representation
by the firm.
Even if the client consents, why would the firm opt to continue the
representation of the client rather than seeking to withdraw and
beginning preparations to defend any malpractice action? At first blush,
one might think that the path of caution for the firm would be to attempt
to withdraw “at the first hint of a problem”283 and then commence in
earnest preparations for any subsequent malpractice action. However,
by doing so, the firm would lose its opportunity to mitigate any harm to
the client284 and thereby minimize the amount of damages it might have
to pay as a result of any subsequent malpractice judgment. In many, if
not most, cases, the firm can render the malpractice issue moot by
achieving a favorable outcome for the client in the transaction or
litigation. Especially if the firm has special expertise in the area and has
already devoted months or years to assembling the relevant facts, the
282
See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1072 (discussing the importance of such
communication).
283
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1747.
284
Id.
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firm might quite sensibly conclude that it is in a much better position
than any other law firm to achieve a successful result for the client.
The interplay of the practical consideration described in the
preceding three paragraphs ultimately leads to the decisive legal issue:
If (1) the outside client does not terminate the firm but withholds consent
to the firm’s in-house consultations; and (2) the firm does not withdraw
and decides to conduct the in-house consultations, does the client’s lack
of consent preclude the attorney-client privilege from attaching to the
consultations? In this variation of the situation, will the firm altogether
forego any privilege if the firm decides to conduct the consultations
despite the client’s refusal to consent?285 There is a strong case that in
most cases, the answer to that question should be no.
Assume arguendo that the firm’s conduct constitutes an ethical
violation of Model Rule 1.7(b). As the Georgia Supreme Court noted in
its 2013 decision, the question of the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege is governed by evidence laws, not legal ethics.286 In Georgia, as
in many states, the history and text of the state ethical rules make it clear
that the ethical rules “‘are not intended to govern or affect judicial
application of . . . the attorney-client . . . privilege.’”287
In passing, in their opinions, both the Ninth Circuit in Rowe and the
Georgia court briefly mentioned the evidentiary doctrine that arguably
controls here—the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege.288 Unfortunately, to date neither the cases applying the
traditional view nor those espousing the minority view have undertaken
a thorough analysis of the applicability of that exception to this fact
situation. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, most recently in
United States v. Zolin, although the law hopes to encourage legitimate
consultations between clients and attorneys, the law does not want to
facilitate the commission of crimes and frauds.289 Consequently, the
privilege does not attach when a client consults an attorney for the
primary purpose of obtaining advice to facilitate the commission of an
ongoing or future crime or fraud. A proponent of the traditional,
285
Id. at 1743 (“If withdrawal is not possible . . . the firm must simply forgo privileged
advice altogether.”); see Koen Books Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle,
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (refusing to apply the
privilege because the firm could have withdrawn from the proceeding).
286
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98,
102 (Ga. 2013).
287
Id. at 106 (quoting GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble, ¶ 19 (Westlaw Next
current with amendments received through 11/1/2013)).
288
United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996); St. Simons Waterfront, LLC,
746 S.E.2d at 107.
289
491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989); see 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.13.2.d, at 1166–67
(noting this tension).
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majority view denying intra-firm privilege might contend that when the
firm conducts in-house consultations without the required consent of the
outside client, the crime/fraud exception applies, precluding the
recognition of an attorney-client privilege. In many situations, though,
that contention will fail.
To begin, most jurisdictions hold that, standing alone, a violation of
the legal ethics rules does not constitute a crime or fraud. It is true that
jurisdictions vary in their views of the breadth of the exception.290 For
example, while some states apply the exception only to fraud upon the
court, most states extend the exception to any tort of fraud.291 However,
only a distinct minority of states have expanded the scope of the
exception to reach violations of the rules of legal ethics.292 Unless the
facts underlying the legal ethical violation also constituted either a crime
or a tort of fraud, the crime/fraud exception cannot be invoked to defeat
a prima facie case for applying the privilege.
To be sure, there are situations in which the facts establishing the
legal ethical violation will also make out a case for fraud. It is one thing
for the firm to engage in internal consultations despite the outside
client’s refusal to consent if the firm informs the client that it
nevertheless intends to conduct the consultations. It is quite another
matter—and a fact situation which would arguably trigger the
crime/fraud exception—when the firm members representing the
outside client seek the in-house counsel’s advice as to how to conceal the
consultations from the client. As Professor Chambliss interprets the facts
in Bank Brussels, there the firm attorneys representing the client
“sought . . . [the] advice” of the head of the firm’s Clients and Ethics
Committee “primarily in order to conceal the conflict.”293 She correctly
concludes that this type of misconduct is tortious and fraudulent.294
However, facts as extreme as those in Bank Brussels are presumably
atypical. In a run-of-the-mill case, the firm seeking to invoke the
privilege can forthrightly inform the outside client that even without the
client’s blessing, the firm members representing the client intend to
consult with in-house counsel about defensive measures in anticipation
of a malpractice claim.295 Of course, at that juncture the client is free to
290
See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.13.2.d(1), at 1170–75 (exploring splits in
authority).
291
See id. § 6.13.2.d(1), at 1172 (stating that the majority of jurisdictions construe fraud
“broadly”).
292
Id. § 6.13.2.d(2), at 1175.
293
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1751.
294
Id.
295
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98,
104–05 (Ga. 2013).
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terminate the firm even if the client did not fire the firm earlier when the
client initially discovered the possible malpractice claim. Moreover, as
the Georgia Supreme Court noted, it is conceivable that, although the
privilege would apply to the consultations, the firm would be guilty of
an ethical violation.296 However, there is no logical necessity for legal
ethics rules to dictate evidentiary doctrine.
In its opinion, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court deemed it significant that in the
lengthy list of thirteen different judicial remedies for a lawyer’s breach of
ethical duties in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,
there is no mention of denial or forfeiture of privilege as a sanction.297
V. CONCLUSION
There is unanimity that the members of a law firm owe a fiduciary
duty of loyalty to the firm’s outside clients. However, “fiduciary” is not
a talisman that makes the firm’s legitimate interests and rights vanish.
The firm has substantial reputational and financial interests that justify
the protection of the attorney-client privilege when the firm has made it
clear that it is the client of an in-house firm counsel and the firm has been
candid in its dealings with the outside client. No human relationship is
perfect. It is to be expected that even after the persons or entities
voluntarily form a trusting, cooperative attorney-client relationship, the
client will sometimes conclude that the attorney has breached its duties
to the client—even when the client decides against immediately
terminating the relationship.
To be sure, when the relationship continues, the outside client has a
right to expect competent legal service during the balance of the
representation. Moreover, the client does not waive the potential
malpractice claim by retaining the firm. For that matter, while the
relationship survives, the outside client is obviously free to hire a second
law firm to begin developing the malpractice case against the firm—
which is precisely what SSW did in the Georgia case.298 No one would
deny that SSW enjoyed an attorney-client privilege protecting its
consultations with the second firm and that SSW could have asserted

296
Id. at 106 n.4 (“We emphasize that this opinion is not intended to resolve the ethical
quandary and instead addresses only the evidentiary questions of privilege . . . .”).
297
RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (Mass. 2013).
298
St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 102 (“SSW retained another law firm . . . to pursue
potential action against Hunter Maclean; new counsel requested . . . that Hunter Maclean
continue to handle the ongoing closings, which Hunter Maclean did . . . .”).
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that privilege against the original firm, Hunter Maclean, in a subsequent
malpractice claim against Hunter Maclean.299
The key issue is whether Hunter Maclean should be entitled to a
similar privilege for the internal consultations that it conducted at the
same time SSW was developing its case against Hunter Maclean. So long
as a firm such as Hunter Maclean does not mislead the outside client, the
firm has a plausible claim that it ought to be free to take prudent steps to
protect its interests against the eventuality that a client such as SSW later
sues for malpractice. The firm should not be “without recourse” to
protect its interests.300 In the long term, judicial encouragement of
internal consultations between the firm members representing the
outside client and experienced firm in-house counsel could result in
improved service to outside clients.301 Veteran in-house counsel can
provide the attorneys representing the outside client with an expert,
more objective perspective that, in many cases, will redound to the
client’s benefit. The traditional, majority view, denying the firm a
privilege, creates a significant disincentive for such consultation. The
emerging minority view, recently endorsed by the Georgia and
Massachusetts courts, is an arguably defensible alternative approach.
As previously stated, this Article offers only a preliminary analysis
of these complex issues. Relatively few courts have addressed these
issues, and unfortunately in those opinions the analysis of the critical
fiduciary and crime/fraud exceptions to the attorney-client privilege has
tended to be conclusory. The courts favoring the traditional view have
slighted the case law permitting fiduciaries to claim the privilege when
they sought counsel after their interests diverged from those of the
beneficiary, and for their part the courts championing the minority view
have skimmed the surface of the applicability of the crime/fraud
exception. Legal malpractice claims are too common and the stakes of
the bar and its clientele are too vital to be satisfied with the current split
of authority. The hope is that this Article will help prompt a more
intense debate over these issues—and a deeper exploration of the
relationship between legal ethical duty of loyalty and the attorney-client
privilege in evidence law.

299
By suing the former firm for malpractice, the client effects a limited waiver of the
privilege; and the firm may disclose its communications with the client to the extent
necessary to defend the malpractice claim. See generally 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9,
§ 6.13.2.a, at 1142–51 (outlining the self-defense exception). However, that waiver does not
extend to the client’s communications with the new counsel prosecuting the malpractice
claim. Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 727 N.E.2d 240, 244–45 (Ill. 2000).
300
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1723.
301
See generally id. (discussing the benefits of applying the intra-firm privilege).
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